A Close Analysis of Buyers and Antitrust Markets by Lavey, Warren G.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 3 
1983 
A Close Analysis of Buyers and Antitrust Markets 
Warren G. Lavey 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Warren G. Lavey, A Close Analysis of Buyers and Antitrust Markets, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 745 (1983). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
A CLOSE ANALYSIS OF BUYERS AND
ANTITRUST MARKETS
WARREN G. LAVEY*
INTRODUCTION
Determining the relevant market is an important step in much anti-
trust analysis, such as when evaluating whether a firm possesses mo-
nopoly power, a merger lessens competition, or a practice restrains
trade.' Yet, despite recent advances,2 the methodologies for defining a
relevant market remain more a matter of "art" than "science."
It is clear from case law and scholarly writings that a relevant market
should include close demand and supply substitutes.3 What is not clear
* Assistant to the Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications Commission.
B.A., Harvard College; M.S., Harvard Univ.; Dip. Econ., Cambridge Univ.; J.D., Harvard Law
School. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission. The author wrote this article while he was a lawyer/economist at Lexecon Inc.,
Chicago, Illinois. The author thanks Frank Easterbrook, William Landes, William Lynk, and
Richard Posner for helpful comments; Deborah Wisse for typing assistance; and his wife and
parents for encouragement.
1. A relevant market is an "area of effective competition." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949). Determination of a relevant market should be based on the
commercial realities of the marketplace. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572
(1966). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977) ("an
antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack any objective benchmarks");
United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) (a tying arrangement is per
se illegal only if the seller has the power to raise prices or impose burdensome terms in the "mar-
ket for the tying product"); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593
(1957) ("Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation
of the Clayton Act .. "); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 330-46 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
4500 (Aug. 9, 1982); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 346-88; Elzinga, Defining
Geographic Market Boundaries, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 739 (1981); Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem
of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973); Horowitz,
Market Denition in Antitrust Analysis: A Regression-Based Approach, 48 S. ECON. J. 1 (1981);
Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); Werden, The
Use and Misuse of Shipments Data in Defining Geographic Markets, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 719
(1981); Note, The Role of Supply Substitutability in Defning the Relevant Market, 65 VA. L. REV.
129 (1979); Werden, Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines (1982)
(U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division Economic Policy Office Discussion Paper).
3. For example, the relevant product market for bottles consists of all products either that
consumers consider to be good substitutes for bottles, e.g., cans (demand substitutes), or that are
produced with resources that can readily be used in making bottles, e.g., windows (supply substi-
tutes). As defined by the Department of Justice:
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is the proper universe of buyers to use as a baseline for identifying close
demand and supply substitutes. An error in defining the proper uni-
verse of buyers can lead to a mistaken market definition and, conse-
quently, to inaccurate predictions of the effects of an acquisition,
merger, distribution restriction, or other action on competition. Many
courts have improperly assessed the degree to which one group of buy-
ers can protect another group of buyers from anticompetitive prices
and conduct. This article describes a procedure for ascertaining the
proper universe of buyers in a market and using this identified group of
buyers to define relevant product and geographic markets.
The "affected-buyers" analysis recommended in this article involves
three steps. First, identify a group of buyers with a common demand.
A firm attempting to increase its price to this group for some output
satisfying this common demand may be likely to find that its sales to
other buyers are affected as well. Second, designate the "common de-
mand" group plus these other likely affected buyers as the proper uni-
verse of buyers for defining the relevant markets. Third, define the
relevant product and geographic markets according to the close de-
mand and supply substitutes4 for the properly designated universe of
buyers.
After describing and illustrating affected-buyers analysis, this article
examines two common approaches to defining antitrust markets and
explains their flaws. One approach, the "firm-competitors" model,
starts the analysis with the firm and attempts to identify its competitors.
For example, if a firm has allegedly monopolized sales of a certain
product, this approach defines the relevant market as sellers which
a market consists of a group of products and an associated geographic area such that (in
the absence of new entry) a hypothetical, unregulated firm that made all the sales of
those products in that area could increase its profits through a small but significant and
non-transitory increase in price (above prevailing or likely future levels).
Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, supra note 2, 4502 n.6. Accord United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956); United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1948); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 304 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp.,
510 F.2d 894, 916-17 (10th Cir.), ceri. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). Many courts follow Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962), and apply a combination of criteria to define
relevant markets, including non-economic factors. See also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 1, at 349; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
229-66 (2d ed. 1980); Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 944-52; Lavey, Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks as Sources of Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 433 (1982).
4. Demand and supply substitutes are discussed supra note 3 and infra notes 19-20 and
accompanying text.
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could sell substitutes to some or all of the firm's buyers.5 A second
approach, the "buyers-alternatives" model, posits particular buyers
with similar demand and attempts to identify the firms competing to
sell to them. Under this approach, if the claim is that a firm mono-
polizes sales of a certain product to particular buyers, the firms which
could sell substitutes to these buyers comprise the relevant market.6
Finally, this article evaluates the merger guidelines issued by the De-
partment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 1982 against
the proposed affected-buyers model.
I. AFFECTED-BUYERS MODEL
A. General Description ofAffected-Buyers Analysis
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the antitrust laws are
designed to promote consumers' welfare.7 Supracompetitive prices-
prices which yield profits to sellers above the competitive level-are
generally associated with a loss of consumers' welfare:8 Such prices
force buyers to spend their incomes in ways which are less attractive to
them than the expenditures they would have made if all goods and
services were supplied at competitive prices.9
5. Cases following the firm-competitors model are discussed infra notes 31-52 and accompa-
nying text.
6. Cases following the buyers-alternatives model are discussed infra notes 53-64 and accom-
panying text.
7. "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.'" Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 66
(1978)). A somewhat broader formulation is that the objective of the antitrust laws is to promote
economic efficiency. See, e.g., I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 7-3 1; R. POSNER & F.
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 152-54 (2d ed.
1981).
Consumers' welfare refers to the utility or satisfaction consumers derive from their expenditures
and savings. Holding quality constant, a lower price for a commodity generally is associated with
a gain in consumers' welfare. See T. SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND COMPETITION 48-53 (1971).
8. Profits above the competitive level may actually promote increases in consumers' welfare,
because such profits provide an incentive for sellers to be more efficient than their rivals. Incen-
tives for efficiency, together with competition, drive down prices to consumers. When a firm's
persistent high profits are not attributable to any greater efficiency of the firm over its rivals, the
prices which yield the high profits are associated with a loss of consumers' welfare. See 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 331-41; Schmalensee, Another Look at Market Power, 95
HARV. L. REV. 1789, 1805 (1982).
9. Some buyers would purchase a product even at a supracompetitive price and, with their
reduced budgets, would purchase less of other products or would decrease their savings. Other
buyers would respond to a product's supracompetitive price by purchasing alternative goods
which are less attractive to them than the product would be if competitively priced. Both of these
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The policy of promoting consumers' welfare requires scrutiny of a
firm which raises its price above the competitive level without adverse
consequences. In a competitive market, the constraint on a firm's in-
centive to charge a supracompetitive price is the probability that its
prospective buyers will turn to competing sellers, making the higher
price unprofitable for the firm. A rational, profit-maximizing firm
would be forced to lower its price to the competitive level under these
circumstances. Much of antitrust enforcement is directed at firms
which possess the ability to raise prices above competitive levels with-
out suffering sufficient sales losses to make the higher prices unprofita-
ble, i.e., firms with market power.' 0
The proper universe of buyers in an antitrust market should be de-
fined as those buyers figuring in a rational firm's decision whether to
charge a supracompetitive price. Correctly identifying the universe of
buyers is critical to evaluating the effect of a price increase on the firm's
profitability. Improper omission of buyers from this universe may lead
to an overestimate of market power by failing to account for lost sales
to buyers affected by the supracompetitive price who will turn to alter-
native sellers. Omission of affected buyers who would not turn to alter-
natives results in an excessive projection of proportional losses
attributable to the supracompetitive price, thereby understating true
market power. Erroneous inclusion of non-affected buyers in the uni-
verse can also frustrate evaluation of the true impact of the supracom-
petitive price. If non-affected buyers can turn to alternatives which are
not available to affected buyers, inclusion of the former group will pro-
duce an underestimate of the firm's ability profitably to charge a
supracompetitive price.
consequences of a supracompetitive price are associated with losses of consumers' welfare which
are allocative, not just distributional. Seegeneraly J. GOULD & C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 9-88 (5th ed. 1980); T. SCITOVSKY, supra note 7, at 55-85.
10. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 939. See also Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Import-
ers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742,745 (7th Cir. 1982) (market power is the "power to raise prices significantly
above the competitive level without losing all of one's business"); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 1, at 322 ("Market power is the ability to raise prices by restricting output").
Economists generally assume that there is an inverse relationship between the quantity of an
output produced and its market-clearing price. If a firm with market power restricted its output,
the market-clearing price (the price which equates the decreased amount supplied with the quanti-
ty demanded) would rise above the competitive level; the firm would be able to sell the decreased
amount of output at a higher price. If a firm with market power raised its price, the quantity of its
product demanded and hence its sales (output) would fall. Competitive firms, on the other hand,
produce the amount of output at which their marginal costs equal the competitive prices. Market
power is generally associated with restrictions of output below this amount.
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1. Buyers With a Common Demand
Affected-buyers analysis starts with a group of buyers with some
common demand characteristics that can be satisfied by a firm's partic-
ular output (however the output is defined). At this step, it is not im-
portant to inquire whether the output chosen constitutes a complete
relevant product market incorporating close supply and demand substi-
tutes; the products in the relevant market will be determined by the
third step of the analysis. Nor is it important whether the output cho-
sen is an aggregate of several products or a component of a discrete
product. II
The buyers in this group would actually purchase the particular out-
put from a specific firm if the output is priced at the competitive level. t2
The group may be smaller than all purchasers of that output or substi-
tute outputs; it also may be smaller than all purchasers of that output
from that firm. Finally, each buyer in the group should be covered by
the protection of the antitrust laws. 3 This "common demand" group
will be referred to as the protected buyers.
From the perspective of the selling firm, charging a higher price for
the output may affect sales to buyers other than the protected buyers.
The responses of these other buyers to the higher price also should be
considered in the firm's decision whether to raise its price to the pro-
tected buyers. For example, the firm may be unable to charge differing
II Buyers of blue widgets from a certain firm may be a group subject to antitrust injury, i.e.,
a loss of welfare caused by a lessening of competition. See, e.g., Blue Shield v. McCready, 457
U S. 465, 482-83 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
The question of whether a group may be subject to antitrust injury must be distinguished from the
question of whether the group has close demand and supply substitutes for blue widgets. The
third step of affected-buyers analysis explores whether a set of buyers, including buyers of blue
widgets, can substitute blue gidgets and whether producers of green widgets can produce products
satisfying their demands. Linkages to other buyers and demand and supply substitutes may pro-
tect buyers with a common demand from actual antitrust injury. Note also that buyers of blue
widgets might be subject to antitrust injury even though the firm sells other forms of outputs that
include blue widgets or are portions of blue widgets. See infra note 73.
12. Contracts or regulation can prevent a firm from raising its price to particular buyers. See,
eg. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 501-04 (1974) (firm bound to long-
term requirements contract at fixed price).
13. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly decided whether the antitrust laws pro-
tect foreign nationals, the Court has indicated that the statutes are designed principally, if not
exclusively, for the protection of domestic consumers. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India, 434 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1978). See also Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864,
869 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding no jurisdiction over claim by Canadian plaintiff against Canadian
subsidiaries of U.S. firms), cert. denied. 455 U.S. 1001 (1982)
Number 31
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prices to different buyers because they have similar demand character-
istics, are indistinguishable to the seller, or could engage effectively in
arbitrage. In addition, news that a seller raised its price to the pro-
tected buyers may cause other current or potential buyers to fear being
charged a similar price in the future, thereby affecting their willingness
to buy the same output or some other output from that seller. More-
over, charging different prices to competing buyers for commodities of
like grade and quality may constitute unlawful price discrimination. 14
2 Universe of Buyers
The proper universe of buyers has two characteristics: (1) members
would be buyers of some output sold by the firm if the firm charged
protected buyers a competitive price, and (2) the firm's sales volume or
the selling price to members would be affected if the firm charged the
protected buyers a supracompetitive price. Faced with a higher price,
some buyers in the universe would continue to purchase the output,
while others would turn to substitutes; all are "affected buyers" in the
sense of a loss of consumers' welfare following the increase in price to
the protected buyers.1" The affected buyers must be included in the
universe because of their perceived linkages to the protected buyers
from the perspective of the firm when it prices its outputs. The proper
universe of buyers therefore may include buyers with demand charac-
teristics quite different from those of the protected buyers, potential
buyers of the firm's output, and buyers who are not protected by the
antitrust laws. 16
The central comparison for antitrust analysis is between (1) the firm's
profits from sales to all the buyers in the universe at the competitive
14. The Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), prohibits a seller
from charging buyers different prices for commodities of like grade and quality when such pricing
poses a reasonable possibility of substantially impairing competition between the buyers or sellers
and when the price difference is not justified by cost differences or by an effort to meet a price
offered by another seller. See, e.g., Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverages, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282
(1983); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981); R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 382-401 (1978); R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: FEDERAL REGULA-
TION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 49-53 (1976); Cooper, Price Discrimination Law and Economic
Efficiency, 75 MICH. L. REv. 962 (1977); 1 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 4, THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAw 27-37 (1980).
Other government regulations may prevent price discrimination. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 202
(1976) (concerning common carriers of telecommunications).
15. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 13.
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price, and (2) the firm's profits from sales to those buyers in the uni-
verse who would buy from it after the price is raised to the protected
buyers. If the second quantity exceeds the first, then the seller has mar-
ket power with regard to the protected buyers, i.e., it would be profita-
ble for the firm to raise the price it charges to the protected buyers
above the competitive level.'7 Although this comparison seldom can be
made quantitatively,'" it nevertheless reveals an important point con-
cerning market definition. The buyers in the universe identified in the
second step-all the affected buyers, not just the protected buyers-
provide the basis for evaluating the firm's market power.
3. Demand and Supply Substitutes
The affected buyers determined by the first and second steps serve as
the baseline for defining the relevant product and geographic markets.
Close demand and supply substitutes are identified with respect to the
universe of affected buyers. The output in the relevant product market
includes that to which the affected buyers could turn in response to the
higher price, i.e., close demand substitutes.19 The product market also
17. Technically, a firm has market power according to the Lerner index if its price exceeds its
marginal cost at its profit-maximizing output. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 940. The inquiry
regarding market power is not whether there would be some demand for a firm's product at a
supracompetitive price, or whether there are substitutes for a given product that would be used by
those buyers who want exactly the same specifications and properties of that particular product.
Rather, the inquiry is whether the firm can profitably charge a supracompetitive price. See, e.g.,
H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978):
That one customer told H&B's expert witness that it would take a rise in price of as much
as 30 percent before he would consider another machine hardly constitutes substantial
evidence that the [machine] was in a class by itself. Even the most ordinary greyhound
has its devoted fans at the racetrack.
Id at 243. See also supra note 10. See generally Fisher, Diagnosing Monopoly, Q. REv. ECON. &
Bus., April 1979, at 7, 15.
18. A precise comparison of the first and second quantities requires knowledge of the elastic-
ity of demand facing the firm at the competitive price with regard to the universe of buyers. This
elasticity is seldom measurable directly. See, e.g., Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel
Serv. of Amer., 651 F.2d 122, 128-29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981) ("Formulas can
express the pertinent relationships between market power, market share, and demand and supply
elasticities [citing Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 945], but the data required for sophisticated
analysis of a particular market are not always available, and their comprehension by jurors is
uncertain at best.").
19. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956)
("[The] market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes
for which they are produced-price, use and qualities considered."); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978) ("[D]efining a relevant
product market is a process of describing those groups of producers which, because of the similar-
Washington University Open Scholarship
752 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 61:745
includes the output from which sellers supplying alternatives to these
buyers could divert production capacity, i.e., close supply substitutes.20
The relevant geographic market encompasses the locations of sellers of
output in the relevant product market actually or potentially supplying
the affected buyers.2 '
Often market shares are used as indicators of a firm's market
22power. The most informative market share under this model is the
ratio of (1) purchases from the firm by buyers in the universe which
would be made at a supracompetitive price to (2) those buyers'
purchases from the firm at a competitive price. This conceptual market
share can be approximated-with varying degrees of precision-by di-
viding the firm's sales to the affected buyers by the sum of those sales
plus the capacity23 of other firms to sell output in the relevant product
market to the affected buyers. If the purchases by the affected buyers at
the competitive price barely exceed those by the protected buyers, alter-
natives available to the affected buyers but not to the protected buyers
should be given little weight in the market share calculation. Such al-
ternatives represent few lost sales for the firm if it charges the protected
buyers a supracompetitive price. Including these alternatives as substi-
ity of their products, have the ability-actual or potential-to take significant amounts of business
away from each other."). Both demand and supply substitutes are relevant in defining product
markets. See supra note 3.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 510 (1948) ("If rolled steel
producers can make other products as easily as plates and shapes, then the [relevant market is not]
plates and shapes alone, but. . . all comparable rolled products."); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v.
Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1273 (9th Cir. 1975) (substitutability in production war-
ranted including concession operations at various facilities presenting leisure-time events in the
same relevant market).
21. The relevant geographic market is restricted to the area in which sellers of a particular
product or service operate and to which purchasers can practicably turn for that product or serv-
ice. See, e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); Elzinga &
Hogarty, supra note 2, at 45-8 1.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) ("The existence of
[monopoly] power ordinarily may be inferred from the predominant share of the market."). Ac-
cord Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv. of Amer., 651 F.2d 122, 129 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 968 (1981).
In addition to drawing inferences from the size of a market share, courts have held that a
declining market share may indicate the absence of market power. See, e.g., United States v.
International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 709 (1927); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. Interna-
tional Business Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 496 n.18 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040
(1978).
23. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 949.
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tutes for all buyers in the universe would cause the estimated market
share to approximate poorly the theoretical market share.
B. Illustrative Applications of Affected-Buyers Analysis
Use of the affected-buyers model to define relevant markets in two
types of fact situations will further help to explain this approach.
L Related Products
One fact situation deals with the ability of a firm to charge a
supracompetitive price for one of several related products. A case illus-
trating this situation is Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments,
Inc. ,24 which involved a claim by Spectrofuge that Beckman had mo-
nopolized a relevant product market consisting of the servicing of
Beckman's scientific instruments. Spectrofuge's allegations focused on
the repair service alternatives available to existing owners of instru-
ments manufactured by Beckman. Assume, contrary to the actual facts
of the case, that Beckman was the sole source of service for these in-
struments. This does not lead to the conclusion that service for these
machines constitutes a relevant market or that Beckman had the ability
to charge a supracompetitive price for service.
The focus of the antitrust laws in this factual circumstance would be
the prevention of anticompetitive exploitation of the existing owners of
Beckman's instruments in need of service; these buyers will comprise
the protected group for purposes of developing a definition of the rele-
vant market. Existing owners would display little price elasticity25 in
their demand for Beckman's service because of the assumed absence of
alternative suppliers of service. Even though potential buyers of Beck-
man's instruments might not need service for several years after
24. 575 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979). For similarly decided
cases involving related products, see General Business Sys. v. North Amer. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d
965 (9th Cir. 1983); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); In re
Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1981); ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), atd sub nom.
Memorex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 287
F. Supp. 143 (D. Md. 1968), modbfed on other grounds, 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 920 (1970).
25. Price elasticity of demand refers to the magnitude of the decline in quantity demanded in
response to a rise in price.
Number 31
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purchasing the instruments, rational buyers would take into account
the availability and cost of service when choosing among various man-
ufacturers' instruments.2 6 New buyers of instruments would be influ-
enced by the satisfaction of existing owners of Beckman's instruments,
including their experiences with the availability and price of Beckman's
service. Beckman's price for service affects potential buyers of scientific
instruments as well as existing owners. The two groups are linked from
the perspective of Beckman when it prices its service. Therefore, when
analyzing Beckman's power to price its services, the proper universe of
buyers should include both existing owners and potential buyers of the
package of Beckman's instruments and service.
The court in Spectrofuge found that Beckman faced vigorous compe-
tition for new buyers of its instruments and that current and future
revenues from sales to new buyers were large relative to revenues from
services to existing owners. The product market was defined to include
the suppliers competing with Beckman for sales of the package of a
new instrument and repair service. The court concluded that a
supracompetitive price for the package would drive potential instru-
ment buyers away from Beckman in a sufficient number to make the
higher price unprofitable. z7
Note that Beckman could profitably charge a supracompetitive price
for service as long as the instrument is priced below the competitive
level by an offsetting amount. But for either of two reasons this does
not necessarily mean that Beckman would have market power over
service to existing owners. First, if the owners anticipate the supracom-
petitive price for service and choose Beckman's instrument anyway,
26. A rational buyer would choose the optimal mix of price and performance, with the cost
and quality of service available for the instrument and need for service included in these consider-
ations. Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 279-80 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied 440 U.S. 939 (1979).
Absent discrimination, consumers who search for optimal price and quality characteristics ben-
efit consumers of the product who do not. "In mass transactions, discrimination by individual
firms among their customers seldom occurs because firms cannot conveniently obtain the informa-
tion to engage in such practices." Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis ofImper-
fect Information: .4 Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 663 (1979).
27. 575 F.2d at 283. The market power apparently conferred by the limited elasticity of
demand facing Beckman with regard to service in the short run is constrained by the detrimental
effects that a supracompetitive price would have on Beckman's ability to attract future business for
service and present and future business for instruments. See generally Klein & Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces inAssuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981 ); Telser, .4 Theory
of Sef-EnforcingAgreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980).
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they would not be exploited by the higher price. A firm in a competi-
tive market should be allowed flexibility in how it prices related prod-
ucts.28 Second, if the owners anticipated a lower price for service,
prospective buyers would be driven away upon learning of an attempt
by Beckman to exploit existing owners. Prospective instrument buyers
would fear further price increases for service after purchasing Beck-
man's instrument, making the purchase less desirable to them. Ulti-
mately, then, the increased service price would be unprofitable to
Beckman.
2 Subsets of a Firm's Customers
A second type of fact situation deals with the ability of a firm to
charge a supracompetitive price to a subset of its customers for a single
type of output.29 Assume a group of buyers, diabetics, with a strong
preference for diet soda; sodas with sugar are unacceptable alternatives
and other beverages are not good alternatives for them. Suppose that
one firm produces diet soda and has a patent on the only sugar substi-
tute that can be used in making diet soda.30 There are no other actual
or potential suppliers of diet soda because of the patent and no close
demand substitutes for diet soda for diabetics. Nevertheless, these facts
do not mean that diet soda is a relevant market or that the firm neces-
sarily has the power profitably to charge diabetics a supracompetitive
price for diet soda.
Once diabetics are identified as the protected buyers, the next step of
the analysis for defining the relevant market inquires into the effects of
raising the firm's price for diet soda to the protected buyers. Two ques-
tions must be addressed. First, are there a substantial number of other
buyers (non-diabetics) who would purchase diet soda at the competi-
tive price but not at a supracompetitive price? Suppose that there are
such buyers who would purchase diet soda for its taste or low calories;
for many of these buyers, sodas with sugar, available from a large
28. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 612 n.l (1977).
29. The court in In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 529 F. Supp. 801, 813-15 (N.D. Cal.
1981). applied affected-buyers analysis in rejecting plaintiffs' claim that existing users of defend-
ant's software constituted a relevant market. Old customers were linked to competition for new
customers since there was no evidence that defendant imposed discriminatory prices or terms on
its old customers. See infra text accompanying notes 44-46 & 55-64 for cases limiting markets to
subsets of firms' customers.
30. The patent does not necessarily confer on the patentee market power. See Lavey, supra
note 3.
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number of suppliers, may be close demand substitutes for diet soda.
The firm's revenues depend on sales of diet soda to these potential buy-
ers of sodas with sugar as well as sales to the protected buyers who are
committed to diet soda.
Second, before expanding the relevant universe beyond the protected
buyers, it is necessary to ask about linkages among the firm's buyers
who have different demand characteristics. Is it possible for the firm to
price discriminate by raising the price for diet soda charged to the pro-
tected buyers without also raising the price for diet soda charged to
other buyers? If so, the firm may be able to charge a supracompetitive
price on sales of diet soda to the protected buyers without losing any
sales of diet soda to potential buyers of sodas with sugar. Suppose that
the firm is unable to differentiate among buyers according to their de-
mand characteristics either because of an inability to identify the
diabetics or their potentially unique buying patterns, or because of ef-
fective arbitrage. In either case, it is proper to define the affected buy-
ers as including a substantial number of buyers with close demand
substitutes for the firm's product.
The final step of affected-buyers analysis defines a relevant market in
terms of the demand and supply substitutes available to the universe of
buyers. Close demand substitutes for a substantial number, but not all,
of the affected buyers would be included in the market. Even in the
absence of supply substitutes and given a group of buyers (diabetics)
without close demand substitutes, the firm may lack market power be-
cause of competition with suppliers of sodas with sugar for a substan-
tial number of diet soda sales.
II. FIRM-COMPETITORS MODEL
A. General Description of Firm-Competitors Anaysis
Firm-competitors analysis starts by focusing on a firm selling a cer-
tain product. The firm faces competition in the form of sellers that
could take a substantial number of sales of that product away from the
firm through substitutes available to some or all of the firm's buyers.
The relevant product market is defined to include the products which
could attract a substantial number of the firm's buyers or which are
made with resources that could be readily directed to produce such
products. The relevant geographic market consists of the locations of
the sellers that could attract a substantial number of the firm's buyers.
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The Supreme Court employed the firm-competitors approach in
United States v. Continental Can Co. ,3 in which the Court found that
glass and metal containers were in the same product market because
there was a pervasive, albeit incomplete, overlap in their uses. If glass
container manufacturers tried to raise their prices, a substantial
number of their buyers would purchase cans.
To understand the flaws of this model, one must recognize that mar-
kets are composed of certain buyers and all sellers competing to satisfy
a demand of these buyers.32 Sellers which compete to satisfy a certain
demand of some buyers may not compete to satisfy the somewhat dif-
ferent demand of other buyers. The existence of some competition be-
tween two sellers, i.e., the existence of some buyers who could turn to
either seller to satisfy a demand, does not answer the critical question
of whether one firm checks the ability of the other profitably to charge
a supracompetitive price to certain, perhaps completely distinct, buy-
ers. A firm may charge different prices to different groups of buyers;
the availability of certain other sellers may protect some, but not all, of
the firm's buyers from paying supracompetitive prices for the firm's
product. Suppose that one firm's products are not good substitutes for
most buyers from a second firm, and that the second firm can discrimi-
nate in its prices.33 The two firms may compete for sales to a few buy-
31. 378 U.S. 441, 452-56 (1964). This case is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
47-52.
32. See, e.g., 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 347 ("In economic terms, a 'mar-
ket' embraces one firm or any group of firms which, if unified by agreement or merger, would
have market power in dealing with any group of buyers."); T. ScrrovsKy, supra note 7, at 14 ("A
person has competition if the party he wants to trade with has alternative opportunities of ex-
change. The people who offer these alternative opportunities to his opposite party are his
competitors.").
33. Price discrimination is "a pattern of pricing that yields different net returns from the sale
or lease of the same or different products to different customers." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note I. at 342. See also Falls City Indus., Inc. v. Vanco Beverages, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1282,
1293 n.10 (1983) (discussing "economic" price discrimination). While price discrimination is evi-
dence of market power, it may be hard to show price discrimination, especially when different
products are involved. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 342; Schwartz & Eisen-
stadt, Vertical Restraints 26-31 (1982) (U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division Economic
Policy Office Discussion Paper). In the affected-buyers model, the possibility of price discrimina-
tion is used as a conceptual aid in analyzing segmentations and linkages among buyers and sellers.
No evidence of actual price discrimination is necessary for this purpose. Through price discrimi-
nation, a firm can successfully compete for certain buyers without sacrificing its ability to extract
higher profits from sales to other buyers for whom there is less competition. See G. STIGLER, THE
THEORY OF PRICE 209-14 (3d ed. 1966). Examples of geographic price discrimination by a firm to
meet competition from sellers in a particular area include Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
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ers who could be faced with supracompetitive prices if the firms
merged and there were no other good substitutes available to those
buyers. On the other hand, the first firm may fail to check the second
firm's ability profitably to charge a supracompetitive price to most of its
buyers, and those buyers would be unaffected by a merger of the firms.
Given the small competitive overlap of the firms, analysis on the firm
level may miss the merger's harm to some customers.
The implicit assumption of the firm-competitors model is that all of
the buyers of a firm's product comprise the proper universe with regard
to which close substitutes can be identified for purposes of defining rel-
evant markets. This analysis would not treat a subset of the buyers of a
firm's product as comprising the proper universe, nor would buyers of
other products from the firm be included in the universe. This model
assumes that a firm is prevented from charging a supracompetitive
price only through competition against sellers which could take a sub-
stantial amount of sales of that product away from the firm. The model
is blind to different segmentations or linkages among buyers of a firm's
products. In some cases this blindness leads to an incorrect market def-
inition and improper conclusion about a firm's market power.
B. Illustrative Applications of Firm- Competitors Analysis
L Related Products
Under the modified Spectrofuge fact pattern, 34 the defendant has no
competitors supplying service for its instruments. Even firms compet-
ing with the defendant for instrument sales cannot cut substantially
into its service business for several years because buyers of new instru-
ments will not require service for some time after their purchases. The
firm-competitors model would define the product market for servicing
the defendant's instruments as one in which the defendant faces no
competition from other sellers. The implicit assumption underlying a
market definition cast in terms of the substitutes available to existing
owners is that buyers who currently demand service for instruments
manufactured by the defendant cannot be protected from monopoly
prices for service through linkages between new buyers and existing
386 U.S. 685 (1967); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674
F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982). An example of non-geographic selective discriminatory pricing to meet
competition for specific customers appears in 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 356
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
34. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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owners. The resulting conclusion is that the defendant has market
power over buyers of service for its instruments.
A case applying firm-competitors analysis to limit the relevant mar-
ket to one of several related products is Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G. 35 There, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
sales of air conditioners for Volkswagen automobiles comprised a rele-
vant market, because sellers of air conditioners to Volkswagen owners
competed only against other sellers of Volkswagen air conditioners.
Affected-buyers analysis might have recognized competition for buyers
across various brands of air conditioned automobiles.
2 Subsets of a Firm's Customers
The Supreme Court arrived at an incorrect market definition by app-
lying firm-competitors analysis in United States v. E.1 du Pont de
Nemours & Co. 16 Du Pont was charged with monopolizing the market
for cellophane. The majority defined the relevant product market to
include other flexible wrapping materials, based on evidence that cello-
phane and other materials had overlapping uses. Cellophane had a
low share of wrappings for uses such as bakery products and candy, but
a 75-80% share of cigarette wrappings. Sales of cellophane accounted
for less than 18% of sales of all flexible wrapping materials, which led
the majority to the conclusion that the defendant lacked market
power.37 Further, the majority presumed sufficient linkages among cel-
lophane buyers-similarity in demand, the availability of alternatives,
and sensitivity to prices charged-that competition among suppliers of
wrapping materials for some users would protect all buyers of cello-
phane from being charged supracompetitive prices.38
In contrast, the dissent concluded that cellophane buyers deserved
the benefits of competition within the cellophane industry.3 9 In effect,
it was argued that buyers of other wrapping materials would not have
35. 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978). Contra Sulmeyer v. Coca
Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835, 850 (5th Cir. 1975) (contours of an industry or a firm's products should
not be dispositive of the bounds of a relevant market), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 930-34 (9th Cir. 1975) (same);
Telex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 917 (10th Cir.) (same), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
36. 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
37. Id at 399.
38. Id at 399-400.
39. Id at 424-25 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
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chosen cellophane in large numbers had the defendant priced cello-
phane at the competitive level. The dissent referred to evidence that
producers of other wrappings remained dominant in sales of flexible
wrappings despite substantial decreases in cellophane's price, and that
these producers were not compelled to match the price decreases.4 °
The majority in du Pont followed firm-competitors analysis by plac-
ing all buyers of cellophane in the universe and concluding from the
existence of acceptable substitutes for some buyers that the relevant
product market included all these substitutes.4' In contrast, the dissent
pursued affected-buyers analysis; viewing actual buyers of cellophane
as the protected group, the dissenters took the position that the affected
buyers in the universe were limited to the protected group plus rela-
tively few buyers of other wrappings. The existence of a wide range of
alternatives and intense competition for sales to only a few potential
buyers in the universe should not bias the market-share calculation.42
As the market was defined by the dissent, du Pont was dominant.
Analysis of the defendant's profits demonstrates that the defendant
possessed the ability profitably to charge supracompetitive prices.43
The buyers that switched from cellophane to other wrappings in the
face of cellophane's supracompetitive price were too few to make the
higher price unprofitable for the defendant. Applying the firm-compet-
itbrs model, the majority was deceived by the existence of substantial
competition for certain buyers into believing that such competition ex-
tended to all its buyers or at least prevented the defendant from charg-
ing supracompetitive prices. As shown in the dissenting opinion,
application of the affected-buyers model would have avoided this mis-
taken result.
40. Id at 418 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Treating cellophane as a relevant market also im-
plies that a substantial number of cellophane buyers would not switch to other wrapping papers if
the price of cellophane were to rise.
41. See Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 960-61 (pointing out that the Court made an
economic error by looking at substitution between cellophane and other flexible wrapping materi-
als at the current price of cellophane rather than at cellophane's competitive price, equal to its
marginal cost). See also Rill & Ransom, The Single Product as a Relevant Market in Attempt to
Monopolize Cases, 26 MERCER L. REv. 823 (1974); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane
Case, 70 HARv. L. REv. 281 (1956); Note, The Propriety of the Single Firm's Product as the Rele-
vant Market in Attempt to Monopolize Cases, 29 BAYLOR L. REv. 77 (1977).
42. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
43. See Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45 AM. EcoN.
Rav. 29, 62 (1955). Persistent supracompetitive profits indicate that a firm possesses market
power. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 331-41.
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In United States v. Household Finance Corp. ,4 the district court took
an approach similar to that of the majority in du Pont. The district
court found that consumer finance companies did not comprise a dis-
tinct market because there was substantial overlap in the types of cus-
tomers served by consumer finance companies and other financial
institutions.45 The appellate court departed from the firm-competitors
model applied by the court below, finding that a distinct market was
supported by the evidence that finance companies offered unique prod-
ucts and services to a class of high risk customers not serviced by other
financial institutions. These customers, constituting fifteen to fifty per-
cent of the finance company clientele, could not turn to the same alter-
native sources of financing available to other finance company
customers.46
Suppose that finance companies could charge their higher risk cus-
tomers interest rates different from and independent of the rates
charged to their customers who have good alternative sources of financ-
ing. Suppose further that other financial institutions could not readily
provide products and services to higher risk customers, i.e., there were
few close supply substitutes. The affected-buyers model would not
place all finance company customers in the same market. Finance
companies might have market power over higher risk customers but
not over others. The firm-competitors model assumes a linkage be-
tween higher risk and other finance company customers which would
be analyzed and rejected by the affected-buyers model. Under these
assumptions, affected-buyers analysis supports the appellate court's
narrower market definition.
A final example of misleading results occasioned by application of
the firm-competitors analysis is United States v. Continental Can Co. 47
The district court held that the existence of some competition in end
uses among metal, glass, and plastic containers did not mean that a
relevant product market included each type of product. Since manu-
facturers of the different types of containers did not compete for some
end uses, the court concluded that firms in the glass container industry
44. 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
45. Id at 1260.
46. Id at 1265. The appellate court failed to consider close supply substitutes in defining the
relevant product market. For example, banks would have encountered low entry barriers in de-
veloping and marketing products and services for higher-risk customers.
47. 217 F, Supp. 761 (S.DN.Y 1963), rer'd, 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
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should not be viewed as competitors of firms in the metal container
industry. The court treated the merger of a glass container manufac-
turer with a metal container manufacturer as a conglomerate combina-
tion involving no lessening of direct (horizontal) competition between
the merging firms.48
The Supreme Court reversed, defining a relevant product market as
all end uses for which manufacturers of glass and metal containers
competed, and concluded that the merger violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act in that market.49 The Court replaced the district court's
naive, industry-oriented analysis of firm competition with analysis
which better reflected the contours of firm competition. Still, if the
Court had not found that inter-industry competition was pervasive,50 it
might have concluded that the firms were not in the same market de-
spite the merger's effect of lessening competition for buyers in certain
end uses.
In contrast, affected-buyers analysis would treat buyers in a certain
end use as protected buyers and inquire into the linkages between those
buyers and buyers in other end uses. If, for example, a firm could raise
its price for beer containers without affecting its prices for or sales of
other containers, then buyers of beer containers may be the protected
buyers as well as the universe of affected buyers. Demand and supply
substitutes should be determined with regard to buyers of beer contain-
ers, thus defining the relevant market and a line of commerce for pur-
poses of section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 If the merger would be likely to
lessen competition in that market, it would be unlawful regardless of
the absence of anticompetitive impacts in other markets for
48. Id at 781-82. See generally Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, supra
note 2, 4504.10-.103; Areeda & Turner, Conglomerate Mergers: Extended Interdependence and
Effects of Interindustry Competition as Grounds/or Condemnation, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1082 (1979);
Goldberg, The Effect of Conglomerate Mergers on Competition, 16 J.L. & EcON. 137 (1973).
49. 378 U.S. 441, 457, 463 (1964).
50. Id at 456. See Werden, Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act and the Analysis of "Semihorizontal"
Mergers, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 135 (1982).
51. Both the district court and the Supreme Court struggled with the relationship between
industries and lines of commerce for purposes of § 7 of the Clayton Act. See 378 U.S. at 449-58;
id at 467-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting); 217 F. Supp. at 780-82. The Supreme Court held as follows:
We would not be true to the purpose of the Clayton Act's line of commerce concept as a
framework within which to measure the effect of mergers on competition were we to
hold that the existence of non-competitive segments within a proposed market area pre-
cludes its being treated as a line of commerce.
378 U.S. at 457.
[Vol. 61:745
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss3/3
ANTITRUST MARKETS
containers.5 2
Of course, the firm-competitors and affected-buyers models can yield
the same market definition in some cases. However, when the resulting
market definitions differ, the affected-buyers approach better reflects
the competitive checks facing a firm in its decision whether to raise
prices above the competitive level.
III. BUYERS-ALTERNATIVES MODEL
A. General Description of Buyers-Alternatives Ana sis
The buyers-alternatives analysis starts with a group of buyers who
would be likely to purchase a firm's product if it were competitively
priced. This group does not necessarily include all actual or potential
buyers of the firm's output. The relevant product and geographic mar-
kets are defined with respect to this group. According to this analysis,
the proper universe of buyers for identifying close substitutes is limited
to this group.
An illustrative application of the buyers-alternatives model appears
in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.5" The Supreme Court
found that the relevant product market was the cluster of services pro-
vided by full-service banks and that the relevant geographic market
was the four-county Philadelphia area. Despite the fact that large Phil-
adelphia businesses had nationwide and worldwide alternatives for
banking services, the Court rejected a larger geographic market be-
cause geographic convenience was an important factor limiting the al-
ternatives available to small depositors and small businesses. With the
52. See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962).
53. 374 U.S. 321, 360-61 (1963). The market analysis in this case is criticized in 2 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, supra note 1, at 411- 14, and in Note, The Line of Commercefor Commercial Bank
Mergers: A Product-Oriented Redefinition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 907 (1983). Another example of
buyers-alternatives analysis is International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 251
(1959) (finding that championship boxing comprised a distinct market, based in part on evidence
that broadcasters did not treat other boxing as a good alternative to championship boxing).
In Harris & Jorde, Market Definition in the Merger Guidelines: ImplicationsforAntitrust Enforce-
ment. 71 CAL. L. REv. 464, 493-94 (1983), the authors advocate a process of market definition
based on identification of "protected interests." "[Miarket definition should begin from the per-
spective of the injured, or potentially injured, groups that the antitrust laws were intended to
protect." Id at 493. In accordance with the buyers-alternative model described in this article,
Harris and Jorde recommend defining the relevant market as the alternatives available to the
protected buyers.
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universe of buyers identified as small depositors and small businesses,
only local banks supplied close substitutes.
This model is similar to the affected-buyers model but with one cru-
cial difference. Both start with a group of protected buyers. The buy-
ers-alternatives model, however, does not employ the second step of the
affected-buyers model: examining whether the buyers in the universe
(the affected buyers) should extend beyond the protected buyers be-
cause of linkages. The crucial flaw in the buyers-alternatives model is
the implicit assumption that no linkages exist to other buyers. Under
this assumption, the firm is prevented from charging a supracompeti-
tive price to the protected buyers because of, and only because of, alter-
natives available to those buyers.
To illustrate, one firm may be able to sell alternative products to a
substantial number, but not all, of a second firm's buyers. The second
firm's buyers may be spread over geographically distant areas or have
other different characteristics which cause them to have distinct alter-
natives.54 Yet, competition for some of the second firm's buyers can
benefit its other buyers if there are sufficient linkages between them.
The second firm's attempt to charge a supracompetitive price to the
buyers potentially not supplied by the first firm can cause other buyers
to turn to the first firm. If so, the first firm poses a competitive restraint
for all of the second firm's buyers and should be included in the market
defined with reference to any universe of the second firm's buyers. The
buyers-alternatives model would not include the first firm in the market
for some of the second firm's buyers because the first firm does not
supply a substitute to them.
B. Illustrative Applications of Buyers-Alternatives Analysis
1. Related Products
The affected-buyers and buyers-alternatives models would lead to
different market definitions for the fact situation presented in Spec-
trofuge. Again assuming that the existing owners in Spectrofuge did
not have alternative sources of supply, Beckman had market power ac-
cording to buyers-alternatives analysis. On the other hand, affected-
buyers analysis revealed that Beckman lacked the ability profitably to
charge this group of buyers a supracompetitive price. The existing
54. See supra note 33.
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owners would comprise the proper universe of buyers for the identifica-
tion of substitutes according to buyers-alternatives analysis, but not ac-
cording to affected-buyers analysis.
2 Subsets of a Firm's Customers
Buyers-alternatives analysis apparently led the Supreme Court to a
mistaken product market definition in United States v. Grinnell Corpo-
ration." The defendants provided accredited central station protective
service. The Court found that such service constituted a separate mar-
ket, excluding unaccredited central station protective services, watch-
men, and on-site alarms. Accredited service offered superior
performance but was more expensive to provide. The range of protec-
tive services gave buyers a variety of price and quality options. The
Court based its finding of a separate market on evidence that the alter-
natives were inferior and that many buyers had a strong preference for
accredited service.56
This evidence did not establish that the defendants had the ability
profitably to charge a supracompetitive price. As the dissent noted, the
defendants operated twenty offices at a deficit in cities with no other
central station, suggesting that a substantial number of buyers had
good alternatives for protective services.57 Furthermore, there was no
evidence that the defendants charged different prices to buyers in the
same locality. It appears that buyers who would purchase only accred-
ited service were linked to a sufficient number of buyers with good al-
ternatives to prevent the defendants from exploiting those who would
purchase only accredited service. Under affected-buyers analysis, this
linkage would lead to a market definition which includes suppliers of
alternative protective services. Buyers-alternatives analysis wrongly as-
sumed no linkage, and consequently arrived at a mistaken market defi-
nition and improper conclusion about the defendants' market power.5
8
55. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
56. Id at 573-75.
57. Id at 592 (Fortas, J., dissenting). This pattern of losses could occur even without good
alternatives if there were no price at which the revenues from the demand for central station
protective services exceeded the cost of supplying those services.
58. The Court in Grinnell defined the geographic market to be the entire nation, despite the
fact that the demand for protective services occurred at fixed locations and that central stations
could supply services only within a 25-mile radius. The Court looked beyond the economic fac-
tors of demand and supply substitutes in defining the geographic market. The scope of the de-
fendants' operation was nationwide, but with local variations in pricing. The defendants dealt
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Two other examples of possibly incorrect market definitions result-
ing from buyers-alternatives analysis should be mentioned. The Sev-
enth Circuit in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission5 9 found a record clubs submarket within the product mar-
ket of all record sales. The primary evidence for defining the sub-
market was the distinct demand characteristics of record club members
as opposed to other record buyers.60 While record club members com-
prised a group of protected buyers, the evidence that the affected buy-
ers were limited to this group was unconvincing. Record club members
purchased some records from retail dealers, and club membership
lasted for only two years.61 If record clubs attempted to raise prices,
they would attract fewer new members, fewer existing members would
renew their memberships, and existing members would buy fewer
records during their memberships from the record clubs. Retail record
sellers probably were good demand substitutes for record clubs, mak-
ing unprofitable any price increase by record clubs above the competi-
tive level. Affected-buyers analysis would not recognize a relevant
submarket of record clubs within the market of record sellers. By ig-
noring the linkages between record club members and other present
and future record buyers, buyers-alternatives analysis delineated incor-
rectly a submarket on which the finding of market power was based.
Buyers-alternatives analysis led to the finding of a newspaper home
with multistate businesses on the basis of nationwide contracts. Id at 575. If multistate buyers
could arrange for local contracts without high transaction costs compared to dealing with a na-
tionwide operation, then alternatives available in each of the local areas where a multistate busi-
ness had establishments checked the prices charged in a nationwide contract. Analysis according
to the affected-buyers and buyers-alternatives models would lead to the same conclusion, namely
that the relevant geographic markets were local areas.
59. 414 F.2d 974, 981 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 907 (1970). As in its later decision
in United States v. Household Fin. Corp., 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1044 (1980), the Seventh Circuit failed to consider supply substitutes in defining the relevant prod-
uct market. The court in Columbia Broadcasting System found that other mail order sellers were
not in the same market as record clubs because the characteristics of their customers differed.
Thus, the court ignored the ability of other mail order sellers to use their existing marketing sys-
tems with different record offerings to increase their selling appeal to customers of record clubs.
Id at 979.
60. A club member is one who prefers to sit at home and select records rather than make
many trips to the store; wants guidance in repertoire selection; seeks economical values;
and is willing to accept the disadvantages of club membership such as long waiting peri-
ods for delivery, limited selection and a contractual commitment as to the number of
purchases.
Id
61. Id at 976, 979.
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delivery market in Evening News Publishing Co. v. Allied Newspaper
Carriers of New Jersey.62 Although about eighty percent of the newspa-
per's circulation was by mail on direct subscription and by sales
through stores and newsstands, 63 the court found that there was a sub-
stantial category of readers of the plaintiff's newspaper who preferred
to have home delivery.' 4 Under buyers-alternatives analysis, the de-
mand characteristics of this group of buyers provided the basis for de-
lineating the market. Affected-buyers analysis would inquire into the
existence and size of a group of buyers who would take home delivery
at the competitive price but not at supracompetitive prices. In Evening
News Publishing, this group might have protected other buyers who
would have preferred home delivery even at supracompetitive prices
from having to pay such prices, if charging supracompetitive prices for
home delivery would have been unprofitable. These buyers, who
would take home delivery only at the competitive price, would link
buyers who would purchase through home delivery even at supracom-
petitive prices to the competitive alternatives of other distribution
channels. Under these conditions, home delivery would be an overly
narrow market.
As with firm-competitors analysis, buyers-alternatives analysis will
yield the same delineation of markets as affected-buyers analysis in
many cases. However, the analysis of the competitive constraints on a
firm's pricing under the buyers-alternatives model is incomplete and
may lead to incorrect market definitions in other situations.
IV. 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) issued merger guidelines on June 14, 1982, intended to clarify
government enforcement standards.65 Each set of guidelines discusses
62. 160 F. Supp. 568, 576 (D.NJ. 1958), aft'd, 263 F.2d 715 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
929 (1959). Other cases distinguishing home delivery and street sales markets for newspapers
include Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1975); Newberry v. Washington
Post Co., 438 F. Supp. 470, 476 (D.D.C. 1977); McGuire v. Times Mirror Co., 405 F. Supp. 57, 59-
60, 66 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
63. 160 F. Supp. at 571.
64. Id at 576.
65. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, supra note 2; Statement of Federal
Trade Commission Concerning Horizontal Mergers, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 546, at 73
(June 14, 1982) [hereinafter cited as FTC Merger Guidelines], reprintedin Oversight of Government
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factors for defining relevant markets. Unfortunately, both fail to incor-
porate the elements of affected-buyers analysis that avoid certain pit-
falls in market definition. The Justice Department guidelines resemble
the firm-competitors model, while those of the FTC reflect some buy-
ers-alternatives analysis. The FTC guidelines will be critiqued first be-
cause they are plainly inadequate; the problem with the Justice
Department's guidelines is more subtle.
A. Federal Trade Commission Guidelines
There is no discussion in the FTC guidelines of how to analyze seg-
mentations and linkages of buyers and sellers in defining markets.
These guidelines note that direct evidence of cross-elasticities of de-
mand or supply is generally unavailable.66 Listed among the indirect
evidence of the existence of separate product markets is "the preference
of a number of purchasers who traditionally use only a particular kind
of product for a distinct use."67 Although such evidence may indicate a
low cross-elasticity of demand, it also suggests buyers-alternatives anal-
ysis and its inadequacies. By ignoring the potential of one group of
buyers to protect another group of buyers from anticompetitive prices
and practices, this evidence can lead to an underinclusive market and a
mistaken assessment of the impacts of a merger on competition. For
example, a merger between Beckman (the defendant in Spectrofuge)
and a hypothetical other supplier of services to owners of Beckman's
instruments might be viewed as unlawful under the FTC guidelines,
but would have little effect on competition among packages of instru-
ments and services.
B. Justice Department Guidelines
The Justice Department guidelines provide a more thorough, system-
atic treatment of factors for defining relevant markets than do those of
the FTC. With regard to relevant product markets, these guidelines
take the products of the merging firms and existing patterns of supply
Merger Enforcement Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearings]. See also Fox, The New Merger Guide-
lines-A Blueprintfor MicroeconomicAnalysis, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 519 (1982); Werden, Market
Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, supra note 2; 1982 Merger Guide.
lines, 71 CAL. L. REV. 280 (1983).
66. FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 65, at 84, reprinted in Oversight Hearings, supra note
65, at 23.
67. Id
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and demand as a beginning point.68 These guidelines recognize possi-
ble buyer segmentation attributable to price discrimination,69 which is
a modification of the firm-competitors model:
Even though a general increase in price [for a merging firm's product]
might cause such significant substitution that it would not be profitable,
sellers who can price discriminate could raise price only to groups of buy-
ers who cannot easily substitute away. If such price discrimination is pos-
sible, the Department will consider defining additional, narrower relevant
product markets oriented to the buyer groups subject to the exercise of
market power.70
Similarly, regarding geographic markets, these guidelines take the loca-
tion of the merging firm as a beginning point and establish a provi-
sional geographic market based on the shipment patterns of that firm
and its strongest competitors.7 Where geographic price discrimination
is possible, additional, narrower geographic markets oriented to those
buyer groups subject to the exercise of market power may be defined.72
The essential distinction between the approach to market definition
in the Justice Department guidelines and the affected-buyers model in-
volves the starting point and direction of analysis. The Justice Depart-
ment guidelines start on the level of the firm's product and shipment
pattern, and ask whether a narrower baseline for identifying substitutes
is indicated by possible price discrimination (i.e., segmentations). In
contrast, the affected-buyers model starts on the level of what is de-
manded by a group of buyers and the locations of sellers to those buy-
ers, and asks whether a broader baseline for identifying substitutes is
indicated by possible linkages. In some cases, this distinction leads to
different market definitions, with the ones defined by the affected-buy-
ers model corresponding more closely to the competitive checks in the
marketplace.
This distinction may be illustrated by reference to the assumed facts
68. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, supra note 2, 4502.10; Werden,
Market Delineation and the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, supra note 2, at 22.
69. The example of price discrimination given in these guidelines is charging different buyers
different prices for products having the same cost. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-
1982, supra note 2, 4502.10. It is not clear whether the Justice Department would define price
discrimination for this purpose as broadly as prices which yield different net returns from the sale
of the same or different products to different customers. See supra note 33.
70. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982, supra note 2, 4502.10 (footnotes
omitted).
71. Id 4502.30.
72. Id
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in Spectrofuge. Beckman's product could be defined as its instruments,
its service for its instruments, or its packages of instruments and serv-
ice.73 The Justice Department guidelines do not help to identify the
proper product definition for the starting point of analysis. Yet, the
starting point is important to the conclusion under these guidelines
about the anticompetitive effects of possible mergers. Consider two
possible mergers for Beckman, one with a hypothetical new supplier of
service for Beckman's instruments and the other with the dominant
supplier of service for other manufacturers' instruments.
If the analysis begins with instruments as the product, the Justice
Department guidelines would indicate that a proper product market is
sales of all instruments which are demand or supply substitutes for
Beckman's instruments. A narrower market to reflect possible price
discrimination is not necessary. Neither merger would increase the
concentration 74 in this market, thus suggesting no opposition by the
Justice Department.
If the analysis begins with service as the product, the product market
would be defined in terms of firms that provide or could provide serv-
ice for Beckman's instruments, supposing that services for other ma-
chines are neither supply nor demand substitutes. Again, the
guidelines call for no narrower market definition since there is no price
discrimination among buyers of this service. With this market defini-
tion, the Justice Department probably would oppose the first merger
73. Courts have recognized ambiguities in defining products in cases involving alleged tying
arrangements. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977);
Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982); Principe v. McDonald's
Corp., 631 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1980); Kugler v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, 460 F.2d 1214
(8th Cir. 1972); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
955 (1972); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 448 F. Supp.
228 (N.D. Cal. 1978), a f'dsub nom. Memorex Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 636
F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981). See also N.W. Controls, Inc.
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 333 F. Supp. 493, 501 (D. Del. 1971) ("antitrust decisions and litera-
ture contain astonishingly little discussion of the criteria to be applied to distinguish between
component parts of a single product and a multiplicity of products"). The affected-buyers model
starts with the output demanded by the protected buyers. Such output can be viewed as one or
more attributes provided by a firm to satisfy the protected buyers' demand and may include what
some would consider to be a single product, multiple products, or a component of a product.
74. Under the Justice Department guidelines, concentration in horizontal mergers is mea-
sured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice-1982,
supra note 2, 1 4503.10. See generally Calkins, The New Merger Guidelines and the Hefindahl-
Hlirschman Index, 71 CAL. L. REv. 402 (1983); Miller, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as a Mar-
ket Structure Variable:.An Exposition for Antitrust Practitioners, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 593 (1982).
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(with the new supplier of service for Beckman's instruments) but not
the second (with the dominant supplier of service for other manufac-
turers' instruments).
Finally, if the analysis begins with packages of instruments and serv-
ice as the product, the product market would include all instruments
which are demand or supply substitutes for Beckman's instruments and
aH services for all these instruments. The concern for price discrimina-
tion does not indicate the need for defining a narrower market. The
second merger might lessen competition between Beckman's package
and the packages including the instruments of other manufacturers by
lessening service rivalry across brands of instruments. Viewed in the
context of this product market, this merger probably would face oppo-
sition from the Justice Department. The first merger might decrease
the attractiveness of Beckman's package by raising the price or by low-
ering the quality of service for Beckman's instruments. If it is assumed
that inter-package competition is strong,75 this merger probably would
not face opposition by the Justice Department.
There is ambiguity under the Justice Department guidelines about a
merger's impact on competition. This ambiguity is attributable to the
lack of guidance on how to define a firm's product. In contrast, the
affected-buyers model unambiguously defines the baseline for identify-
ing substitutes as what the affected buyers would purchase from Beck-
man if it charged a competitive price for its output demanded by the
protected buyers. Linkages from the service demanded by the pro-
tected buyers lead to a product market defined both in terms of service
for Beckman's instruments and of packages of instruments and service
demanded by the affected buyers.76
While the first merger might be opposed under the Justice Depart-
ment guidelines by using the starting point of service or by using all
75. Interbrand competition--competition among different manufacturers of the same generic
product-is "the primary concern of antitrust law." Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977).
76. Of course, analysis under the Justice Department guidelines can employ multiple starting
points, just as analysis under the affected-buyers model can employ multiple groups of affected
buyers. However, in this example the Justice Department guidelines do not indicate whether a
lessening of competition determined by starting with service should justify challenging a merger.
The linkage between service and instruments is not explored in this analysis but may negate con-
cerns about lessened competition. In contrast, the affected-buyers model provides the basis for
challenging a merger whenever a determination of lessened competition is made by starting with
any group of protected buyers.
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three starting points as equally credible alternatives, the merger proba-
bly would not be opposed pursuant to affected-buyers analysis. An in-
crease in the price of service for Beckman's instruments would be
unprofitable because of a shift in demand to other manufacturers'
packages of instruments and service. While the second merger might
be unopposed under the guidelines using the starting poiiits of instru-
ments or service, it probably would be opposed pursuant to affected-
buyers analysis. An increase in the price of service for Beckman's in-
struments could be accompanied by an increase in the price of service
for other manufacturers' instruments, resulting in potentially little loss
of business for the merged firm in service or packages of instruments
and service.
CONCLUSION
Defining relevant markets is an important and difficult area of anti-
trust analysis. As the Supreme Court has recognized, markets seldom
can be delineated and market shares seldom can be calculated pre-
cisely.77 A market can provide at best only a rough picture of a firm's
market power.78 The guiding goal in delineating markets is to assess
the ability of a firm profitably to charge a supracompetitive price. Mar-
kets should reflect the linkages and segmentations among buyers and
among sellers. Such relationships should not be presumed. Linkages
among sellers in a market are not always limited to suppliers of alterna-
tive products, nor are linkages among buyers in a market based solely
on similar demand characteristics. Affected-buyers analysis evaluates
the strength of these linkages, leading to market definitions and market
shares from which a firm's market power can be assessed more
accurately.
The three models for defining markets described in this paper-af-
fected-buyers, firm-competitors, and buyers-alternatives-yield identi-
cal market definitions in many cases. Where they differ, the affected-
buyers model provides a more reliable approach to analyzing market
power.
77. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)
("Industrial activities cannot be confined to trim categories.").
78. Landes & Posner, supra note 2, at 983.
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